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Chung

AN OLD CRIME IN A NEW CONTEXT: MARYLAND’S NEED
FOR A COMPREHENSIVE CYBERSTALKING STATUTE
Christie Chung*
INTRODUCTION
The Department of Justice defines stalking as a “pattern of
repeated and unwanted attention, harassment, contact, or any other
course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a
reasonable person to feel fear.”1 Unlike a multitude of other crimes,
stalking is unique in that it is a composite offense made up of a pattern
of, oftentimes, varied behaviors.2 These behaviors include, but are by
no means limited to: direct and indirect threats of harm, following or
lying in wait for the victim at their home, place of work, and other
frequented locales, and sending unwanted gifts and items.3
Although the first anti-stalking statute was not passed until
1990, rapid technological advances in the intervening decades have
entirely redefined the scope of the offense.4 As a “borderless medium”
that provides a veneer of anonymity, the internet has proven to be a
fertile landscape of new opportunity for those looking to stalk, harass,
or otherwise attack others.5 Cyberstalking, as a subset of computer-
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1
Stalking, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ovw/stalking (last updated
Jan. 6, 2016).
2
See id. Stalking can be defined as “a course of conduct directed at a specific person
that involves repeated visual or physical proximity, nonconsensual communication,
or verbal, written or implied threats, or a combination thereof, that would cause a
reasonable person fear.” PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. JUST.,
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., STALKING IN AMERICA: FINDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 2 (Apr. 1998),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/169592.pdf. See also infra Part III.B.
3
Stalking, supra note 1 (linking to Stalking Resource Center, NAT’L CTR. FOR
VICTIMS OF CRIME, http://victimsofcrime.org/our-programs/stalking-resource-center
(last visited Apr. 18, 2017)).
4
See Naomi H. Goodno, Cyberstalking, a New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness
of Current State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125, 127, 129 (2007).
5
Id. at 129.
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related crimes, occurs when perpetrators utilize information
technology infrastructures (i.e. cyberspace) to carry out the
conventions of physical stalking.6
This Comment maintains that the current state of Maryland’s
criminal law leaves cyberstalking victims with questionable and
uncertain means of recourse. In establishing a body of law that befits
the seriousness of cyberstalking as a potential precursor to violent
crime, the State should create a statute tailored to the crime of
cyberstalking instead of relying on traditional stalking and harassment
laws that do not work in the cyber context. Specifically, the
formulated law needs to articulate clear actus reus and mens rea
standards that adequately balance free speech concerns with the needs
and experiences of victims.7
Part I of this Comment provides a profile of the victims against
whom cyberstalking is often perpetrated.8 This examination of the
victims provides a central framework through which subsequent
discussion of the crime and reform measures should be situated. Part II
of this Comment differentiates cyberstalking from traditional stalking
and assesses how these differences inform the process of investigating,
prosecuting, and convicting offenders.9 Part III and Part IV
contemplate the sufficiency of current federal and Maryland statutes,
respectively.10 Finally, Part V addresses the identified deficiencies in
existent statutes and submits a draft cyberstalking statute for adoption
in the state of Maryland.11

6

See generally Marlisse S. Sweeney, What the Law Can (and Can’t) Do About
Online Harassment, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/11/what-the-law-can-and-cantdo-about-online-harassment/382638 (exploring the dark side of cyberspace and the
variety of interpersonal communications that take place therein).
7
See infra Part V.C.
8
See infra Part I.
9
See infra Part II.
10
See infra Part III–IV.
11
See infra Part V.

Chung

2017]

CYBERSTALKING

119

I. CONTEXTUALIZING CYBERSTALKING THROUGH THE PRISM OF
VICTIM EXPERIENCES
Although stalking is a gender-neutral crime in that both men
and women are victimized, the majority of victims are
disproportionately female.12 Unsurprisingly, this gendered dimension
of traditional stalking has carried over into virtual perpetration of the
crime.13 Working to Halt Online Abuse, a nonprofit organization
founded in 1997, reported that 72.5 percent of their incident reports
between 2000 and 2007 originated from women.14 Moreover, women
are not only more likely to be stalked online, the harassment they
encounter is more likely to be gender-based.15 That is, while men are
more likely to be called “offensive names,” or be “purposefully
embarrassed,” the harassment women face online often stems from the
fact that they are women, and is more likely to be sexual in nature.16
Without a doubt, men and women are both subjected to harassment
online;17 however, acknowledgement of how the harassment differs

12

SHANNAN CATALANO, STALKING VICTIMS IN THE UNITED STATES–REVISED,
OFFICE OF JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1 (Sept. 2012),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svus_rev.pdf. In a study of 220,995,170
individuals over a 12-month period, 2.2% of females experienced stalking as
compared to 0.8% of males. Id. at 4.
13
See Soraya Chemaly, 12 Examples: Pew’s Online Harassment Survey Highlights
Digital Gender Safety, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sorayachemaly/pew-online-harassment-survey_b_6028350.html (last updated Dec. 22,
2014) (“Women are much more likely to experiencing [sic] stalking, sexual
harassment and sustained harassment online.”); see also Amanda Hess, Why Women
Aren’t Welcome on the Internet, PAC. STANDARD (Jan. 6, 2014),
https://psmag.com/why-women-aren-t-welcome-on-the-internetaa21fdbc8d6#.u9qphnlna. According to a 2006 study conducted by the University of
Maryland, “[a]ccounts with feminine usernames incurred an average of 100 sexually
explicit or threatening messages a day. Masculine names received 3.7.” Id.
14
Danielle Keats Citron, Civil Rights in Our Information Age, in THE OFFENSIVE
INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND REPUTATION 32 (Saul Levmore & Martha C.
Nussbaum eds., 2010); Working to Halt Online Abuse, http://www.haltabuse.org
(last visited Apr. 18, 2017).
15
See Chemaly, supra note 13 (arguing that women not only experience more severe
forms of cyber harassment, but that the harassment stems from a deeply rooted
culture of misogyny).
16
See id. (commenting on the quality and nature of harassment that men are more
likely to endure online as compared to women).
17
See id. (“Researchers found that 40 percent of Internet users report experiencing
some form of online “harassment,” defined in the study as name-calling, purposeful
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both in form and in how it is experienced by victims will be crucial for
effective legislative reform.18
In exploring the contours of cyberstalking by looking to its
victims, it is necessary to situate cyberstalking within the context of
intimate partner violence (IPV).19 The prevalence of stalking in
abusive relationships is well documented.20 Seventy-six percent of
women murdered by their intimate partners experienced a period of
stalking prior to their deaths.21 Similar to physical stalking, it is
difficult to determine with absolute certainty the prevalence of
cyberstalking because of underreporting.22 That being said, in a 2009
victimization survey conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics,
twenty-six percent of stalking victims indicated that their stalkers’
pattern of conduct involved the use of technology in one form or
another.23 Notwithstanding the fact that this figure is probably, in
actuality, much higher,24 the number of stalking victims reporting the
use of technology is likely only to increase in the coming years as
technology continues to transform the spheres of social interaction.25
Society has immeasurably benefitted from modern
technological advances, yet cyberspace has proven to be a regrettably
fertile landscape for stalkers and abusers.26 IPV relationships go
embarrassment, stalking, sexual harassment, physical threats and sustained
harassment.”).
18
Goodno, supra note 4, at 128–33 (stating five different ways in which
cyberstalking differs from traditional, physical stalking that must be taken into
account for legislative reform).
19
See Andrew King-Ries, Teens, Technology, and Cyberstalking: The Domestic
Violence Wave of the Future?, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 131, 133 (2011).
20
See id. at 136 (commenting on “the centrality of stalking to the domestic violence
relationship and the connection between stalking and risk of physical violence.”).
21
Id.
22
Donna M. Schwartz-Watts, Commentary: Stalking Risk Profile, 34 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY L. 455, 455 (2006) (“Stalking remains underreported. Only one half to
one third of stalking victims reported such crimes.”); Michael L. Pittaro, Cyber
Stalking: An Analysis of Online Harassment and Intimidation, 1 INT’L J. CYBER
CRIM. 180, 182 (2007) (explaining how cyberstalking contributes to the “dark
figure” of crime due to rampant underreporting and under-detection).
23
King-Ries, supra note 19, at 133.
24
Schwartz-Watts, supra note 22, at 455.
25
See Pittaro, supra note 22, at 181.
26
See Aily Shimizu, Comment, Recent Developments: Domestic Violence in the
Digital Age: Towards the Creation of a Comprehensive Cyberstalking Statute, 28
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beyond the physical component of violence; authorities characterize
IPV as defined by patterns of abuse that are centrally geared towards
the elimination of personal autonomy and the establishment and
maintenance of control.27 In looking at the common methods of
abusers—“physical and emotional isolation, repeatedly invading the
victim’s privacy, supervising the victim’s behavior, terminating
support from family or friends, threatening violence toward the victim,
threatening suicide”—it becomes abundantly clear that the internet
presents new avenues of convenience and opportunity.28 The
following two excerpts illustrate the societal costs borne by the advent
and commercialization of new technologies:
A Wisconsin article reported that a woman found it
impossible to escape her ex-boyfriend. He would follow
her as she drove to work or ran errands. He would
inexplicably pull up next to her at stoplights and once
tried to run her off the highway…. The article reported
that the stalker put a global positioning tracking device
between the radiator and grill of the survivor’s car.29
In September 2001, a Michigan man was charged with
installing spy software on the computer of his estranged
wife. He installed a commercially available software
program on her computer at her separate residence.
Without her knowledge, the program sent him regular
emails reporting all computer activity, including all
emails sent and received and all Web sites visited.30
Looking at both the strong correlation between stalking and violence,
and the ways in which stalkers are increasingly exploiting
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 116, 117–18 (2013) (describing the general
environment of the internet as favorable to stalkers due to the anonymity and
freedom from geographic constraints that it confers).
27
King-Ries, supra note 19, at 135 (stating “[w]hile violence is a critical component
of the relationship, the broader power and control dynamic prevails: ‘The battering
relationship is not about conflict between two people; rather, it is about one person
exercising power and control over the other.’”).
28
Id.; see also infra Part III.
29
Cynthia Southworth et al., Intimate Partner Violence, Technology, and Stalking,
13 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 842, 847 (2007).
30
Id. at 848.
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technological channels to interject themselves into the lives of their
victims, Maryland’s lack of a dedicated cyberstalking statute is an
oversight that undermines the State’s ability to ensure the safety and
well-being of all its citizens.31
II. USING ELECTRONIC MEDIUMS IN PLACE OF OR IN ADDITION TO
PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE—CYBERSTALKING
The differences between physical stalking and stalking as
perpetrated through electronic mediums leaves victims of
cyberstalking in a precarious position. In addition to facing many of
the same challenges encountered by victims of traditional stalking,
victims of cyberstalking must confront the unique problems posed by
cyber-based crimes.32 Along with the consequences of potentially
having their personal information compromised, victims of
cyberstalking must develop strategies for addressing preservation of
digital evidence, law enforcement minimalization of their sustained
harms, and increased offender capabilities.33
A. Successful Prosecution of Cyberstalking is Frustrated by
the Heavy Evidentiary Burden Carried by Victims and the
Tendency to Trivialize Incidents of Cyberstalking
Victims of cyberstalking are hamstrung by the same obstacles
that hinder the successful prosecution and conviction of conventional
stalkers, but to a greater degree.34 For one, stalking is one of a handful
of crimes wherein the responsibility of investigation and data
collection flows to victims rather than law enforcement.35 In the
absence of physical evidence or witnesses who can corroborate a
31

See infra Part IV.
See generally KRISTIN FINKLEA & CATHERINE A. THEOHARY, CYBERCRIME:
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES FOR CONGRESS AND U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT 1, CONG. RES.
SERV. (2015) (outlining the complex economic, safety, and legal issues posed by
“twenty-first century criminals”—that is, those who utilize the digital world to
victimize).
33
See infra Part II.A.–B.
34
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN GRANTS OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., STALKING AND
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE THIRD ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER THE
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 41 (1998).
35
See ANDREW KARMEN, CRIME VICTIMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO VICTIMOLOGY 380
(9th ed. 2016) (noting that the onus is on stalking victims to collect and document
evidence of their victimization).
32
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victim’s allegations, it is often difficult to differentiate between
“whether the contact was an act of stalking or an unintentional
encounter.”36 Consequently, in many cases, “the burden of proof is so
high that very few stalkers are found guilty.”37 In terms of
cyberstalking, digital evidence presents its own unique set of
challenges. As a repository of a tremendous amount of information,
personal computers, the internet, and technology in general have
rapidly become an indispensable investigative tool for victims and law
enforcement alike.38 Be it archiving incriminating e-mails or
screenshotting threatening social media posts, victims may find it
easier to preserve the evidence they need to build a case.39 The
problem with reliance on digital evidence stems not from its existence,
however, but from its fragility and issues of accessibility. 40 The digital
trail left by online activity is of little use if it is encrypted beyond
recognition or remotely wiped before it can be processed.41 Moreover,
technical proficiency in activities such as encryption or hacking is no
longer a limiting factor.42 The ever-growing “services-based nature of
cybercrime” allows stalkers lacking technological proficiency to
nevertheless achieve their ends by purchasing the skills and services of
others who do possess the requisite degree of technical expertise.43
36

See supra note 34.
KARMEN, supra note 35.
38
See SEAN E. GOODISON ET AL., DIGITAL EVIDENCE AND THE U.S. CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 1, NAT’L INST. JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (2015),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248770.pdf (detailing how technological
advances have caused major shifts in law enforcement methods for criminal
investigations).
39
Id. at 4.
40
Id. at 7 (“Modern electronic devices…can also be fragile. As a result, digital
evidence can be damaged or altered by basic actions, such as dropping an item in
water, passing a powerful magnet by it, or even through sheer physical force to break
components”).
41
Id. at 4 (noting the value of encrypting data to prevent others from accessing the
content of communications between users).
42
See RAJ SAMANI & FRANÇOIS PAGET, CYBERCRIME EXPOSED: CYBERCRIME-AS-ASERVICE, MCAFEE 1, 4 (2013), http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/whitepapers/wp-cybercrime-exposed.pdf (investigating the burgeoning underground
market of services and products available for purchase or rent by potential
cybercriminals).
43
Id. at 4–5 (identifying the following four categories of services available to willing
buyers: research (described as the sale of information concerning system
vulnerabilities), crimeware (described as the “toolset” or hardware needed to conceal
malware and launch attacks), cybercrime infrastructure (described as the platforms
37
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As an aggregate crime, cyberstalking is difficult to regulate in
the absence of overt misconduct on the part of the stalker.44 In
isolation, a variety of stalking behaviors may ostensibly appear
insignificant or innocuous.45 Taken in the aggregate and in the context
of IPV, however, individual stalking incidents can be viewed as
benchmarks of a rapidly escalating encounter between the victim and
the perpetrator.46 To the great detriment of cyberstalking victims,
stalking behaviors carried out online appear particularly prone to being
mischaracterized or trivialized.47 Citing a study conducted by the
University of Bedfordshire in which “over 60 percent of survey
participants reported receiving no help from police regarding their
cyber harassment complaints,” University of Maryland Law professor
Danielle Citron associates high rates of underreporting to the fact that
“[v]ictims are uncertain as to whether [cyberstalking/harassment] is a
crime or fear the police would not take them seriously.”48 The creation
of a separate cyberstalking statute and its codification in Maryland’s
criminal law will not only provide guidance to law enforcement
officers, but it will also legitimize the injuries sustained by victims as
real and tangible harms.
B. The Internet has Fundamentally Transformed the Crime of
Stalking—From the Identity of its Perpetrators and their
Methodologies to the Harms Inflicted on Victims
Before turning to a discussion of the current state of federal
and state cyberstalking laws, it is necessary to consider the scope of
the crime. Generally, conventional stalking requires the stalker to be in
used to host attacks), and hacking (described as password cracking and personal
information acquiring services)).
44
See John B. Major, Note, Cyberstalking, Twitter, and the Captive Audience: A
First Amendment Analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2), 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 117, 126
(explaining how regulation of cyberstalking is difficult given the fact that it may
include acts which appear innocuous to outside observers). Stalking is less about
individual actions taken against a victim and more about the cumulative harm
inflicted. See TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 2.
45
Major, supra note 44, at 126–27.
46
Id.
47
DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 84 (2014) (associating
the trivialization of online harassment with institutional deficiencies in the training
and education of law enforcement officers).
48
Id. at 21.
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relatively close physical proximity to the victim.49 In contrast,
geographic boundaries are rendered irrelevant with cyberstalking as
the internet provides offenders with a cheap and effective means of
making direct contact with their victims.50 Cyberspace also exposes
individuals to an almost immeasurable number of potential stalkers.51
In the current age of social media, we freely broadcast the intimate
minutiae of our daily lives in a way that we would never do when
confronted with strangers in the real world. The National Crime
Victimization Survey reports that the vast majority (69.9%) of
conventional stalkers were either intimate partners or otherwise
acquainted with their victims.52 However, when it comes to
cyberstalking, research suggests that a far greater percentage of
perpetrators are strangers to the victim.53 Victims may find their
ability to meet evidentiary burdens further frustrated and fears
compounded by this anonymous facet of online interactions.54
Perpetrators will find that they are limited only by their
imaginations in utilizing technology to harass and surveil. Common
techniques employed by cyberstalkers include sending unsolicited
hateful, obscene, or otherwise threatening e-mails en masse, posting
personal or fictitious information about the victim, impersonating the
victim, and soliciting the participation of third parties.55 Individuals
49

See Shimizu, supra note 26, at 117–18 (commenting on how geographic
boundaries are a nonfactor in the commission of cyberstalking).
50
Id.
51
For example, Twitter has 313 million active daily users. COMPANY,
https://about.twitter.com/company (last visited Apr. 18, 2017). Facebook surpassed
one billion users in 2015. Facebook, FACEBOOK (Aug. 27, 2015),
https://www.facebook.com/facebook/videos/vb.20531316728/10154009776186729/
?type=2&theater.
52
CATALANO, supra note 12, at 5.
53
BONNIE S. FISHER & JOHN J. SLOAN, CAMPUS CRIME: LEGAL, SOCIAL, AND
POLICY PERSPECTIVES 247 (3rd ed. 2013).
54
See Adrienne Lafrance, When Will the Internet be Safe for Women?, THE
ATLANTIC (May 20, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/05/when-will-the-internet-besafe-for-women/483473. Congresswoman Katherine Clark, who has been a victim of
pernicious cyber harassment because of her legislative efforts to reform
cyberstalking and harassment laws, explains, “You do internalize it, and even though
it is not someone directly in front of you, there is something about the anonymous
nature of it—when you don’t know where a threat is coming from—that really gets
into someone’s psyche.” Id.
55
Sweeney, supra note 6.
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will need to adopt an increasingly proactive approach to cybersecurity
as “[d]atabases of personal information available on the Internet can
enable a stalker to trace a victim’s…real name, address, telephone
number, and other personal information.”56 In the first successful
conviction of an offender under a state’s cyberstalking law, a
California man was convicted after he impersonated his victim in
various chat rooms and solicited others to visit the victim at her house
to act out so-called “rape fantasies.”57 On at least six different
occasions, men appeared at the victim’s house—sometimes in the
middle of the night—and offered to rape her.58 The disturbing facts of
this case are not unique, and in a number of other cases, have resulted
in the rape and violent assault of women.59
In many ways, modern technology has completely
revolutionized the capabilities of stalkers.60 With global positioning
systems (GPS), spyware software,61 keystroke loggers,62 and hidden
56

TRUDY M. GREGORIE, CYBERSTALKING: DANGERS ON THE INFORMATION
SUPERHIGHWAY, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME 3 (2001),
http://victimsofcrime.org/docs/src/cyberstalking---dangers-on-the-informationsuperhighway.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
See Caroline Black, Ex-Marine Jebidiah James Stipe Gets 60 Years for Craigslist
Rape Plot, CBS NEWS (June 29, 2010, 1:30 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/exmarine-jebidiah-james-stipe-gets-60-years-for-craigslist-rape-plot (discussing a case
in which a man posed as his ex-girlfriend on Craigslist, which led to her being raped
at gunpoint); see also Sarah Larimer, Woman Uses Craigslist “Rape Fantasy” Ads
to Target Her Ex’s Wife, Authorities Say, WASH. POST (July 20, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/07/20/woman-usescraigslist-rape-fantasy-ads-to-target-her-exs-wife-authoritiessay/?utm_term=.aabe9c4fd178 (discussing a case in which a woman posed as her
husband’s ex-girlfriend on Craigslist, causing the ex-girlfriend to be physically
attacked in her home).
60
See supra text accompanying note 26.
61
See Viruses, Spyware, and Malware, MIT INFO. SYS. TECH.,
https://ist.mit.edu/security/malware (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (defining spyware as
“[s]oftware that surreptitiously gathers information and transmits it to interested
parties. Information gathered includes visited websites, browser/system information,
and your computer’s IP address.”).
62
See Mary O. Foley, How to Avoid Dangerous Keyloggers, NORTON,
https://us.norton.com/yoursecurityresource/detail.jsp?aid=key_loggers (last visited
Apr. 18, 2017). Keystroke loggers, or keyloggers, track every key that is depressed
on a computer or laptop’s keyboard. Id. Typically used to capture sensitive
information such as passwords, social security numbers, or bank accounts,
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cameras, stalkers can monitor the real time movements of their
victims, track all computer activities, and harvest sensitive information
such as passwords and PIN numbers at their leisure and in the
convenience of their own homes.63 Similar to victims of other
cybercrimes, it is difficult for victims of cyberstalking to even detect
when offenders compromise their devices, privacy, and safety. 64 One
example of the burgeoning risk posed by cybercriminals is Luis
Mijangos, who was arrested in 2010 after the FBI discovered him
using malicious software to hack into the computers of more than 200
victims.65 Mijangos listened to the victims through their computer
microphones and watched them through their webcams.66 Of the
victims, forty-four were juveniles.67 Had Mijangos not begun
blackmailing female victims with stolen sexually explicit photographs,
many of these breaches would have surely remained unknown to the
victims and law enforcement.68
From the identity of perpetrators down to the harms being
inflicted on victims, advances in technology have entirely transformed

keyloggers can be transmitted as software programs or physically installed as
hardware on computers. Id.
63
Southworth et al., supra note 29, at 848–49.
64
ADJUSTING THE LENS ON ECONOMIC CRIME: PREPARATION BRINGS OPPORTUNITY
BACK INTO FOCUS 8, GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRIME SURVEY 2016, PWC (2016),
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/economic-crimesurvey/pdf/GlobalEconomicCrimeSurvey2016.pdf (commenting on issues of
detection and the trend of organizations not realizing that their networks have been
compromised for extended periods of time––1 in 10 economic crimes were
discovered entirely by accident.). See also Nate Anderson, Meet the Men Who Spy
on Women Through Their Webcams (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://www.wired.co.uk/article/webcam-spying (explaining how remote
administration software gives hackers autonomous control over the computers of
their victims).
65
Richard Winton, “Sextortion”: 6 Years for O.C. Hacker Who Victimized Women,
Girls, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2011, 1:42 PM),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/09/sextortion-six-years-for-oc-hackerwho-forced-women-to-give-up-naked-pics-.html.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. Mijangos threatened to post the intimate images and videos he found unless his
female victims recorded and sent pornographic videos and images to him. Id. After
one victim showed the treats to a friend, Mijangos posted nude photos of the victim
to her Myspace page. See id.
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the nature of stalking.69 While legislative reform has attempted to keep
pace with technological innovation, the continuously changing
boundaries between cyberspace and the physical world present
difficult challenges to the formulation of adequate law.70
III. AMBIGUITIES IN FEDERAL CYBER LAWS LEAD TO INEQUALITIES
IN THE PROSECUTION OF OFFENDERS
In Computer Crimes, authors Fehr, LiCalzi, and Oates note that
“states are often the leaders in the effort to address issues
of…cyberstalking.”71 Such must be the case in Maryland because
existent gaps in federal law handicap the ability of cyberstalking
victims to obtain justice.
A. Conflicting Interpretations of the Interstate
Communications Act Fosters Differential Access to Justice
for Cyberstalking Victims
One of the key federal statutes that cyberstalking could fall
under is 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), the Interstate Communications Act.72 The
statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) states that, “Whoever
transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication
containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the
person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.”73 To secure a conviction under §
875(c), the government must successfully prove the following three
elements: “(1) a transmission in interstate [or foreign] commerce; (2) a
communication containing a threat; and (3) the threat must be to injure
[or kidnap] the person of another.”74 With regards to cyberstalking, the
first and third factor do not tend to present much issue. The second
factor however raises serious issues stemming from the fact that
“threat” is a term that can be subject to several constructions.

69

See supra notes 47–54,60–63 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.
71
Caroline Fehr et al., Computer Crimes, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 977, 1018 (2016).
72
18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012).
73
Id.
74
United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1494 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting United
States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1992)).
70
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The First Amendment protection of free speech does not
extend to communications that convey a “true threat.”75 True threats
are taken to mean “statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence.”76 In large part, internet communications pose
particular First Amendment issues because the intent of users is not
easily discernible.77 Discrepancies in how various circuit courts have
determined the presence or absence of mens rea have led to inequities
in the remedies available to victims of cyberstalking.78 Under an
objective standard, the mens rea inquiry looks to whether a reasonable
person receiving the threat would believe that it was a threat. 79 Courts
that apply a more subjective standard for mens rea instead focus on
whether a “reasonable speaker would foresee that the listener would
interpret the speech as a threat of violence.”80 Differences in opinion
as to the mens rea requirement are of tremendous importance because
the standard that is applied also affects the defenses that will be
available to defendants.81 While a defendant’s ability to show that he
did not intend for the communication to be threatening may be
determinative under a subjective standard, it would carry no weight in
a jurisdiction that follows the objective standard.82
The facts of United States v. Alkhabaz are illustrative of how §
875(c)’s utility to victims of cyberstalking will fluctuate depending on
75

United States v. Watts, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969).
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2002).
77
See generally Alison J. Best, Note, Elonis v. United States: The Need to Uphold
Individual Rights to Free Speech While Protecting Victims of Online True Threats,
75 MD. L. REV. 1127 (2016).
78
See Paul T. Crane, Note, “True Threats” and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV.
1225, 1235–48 (2006) (surveying the differences in how lower courts have
interpreted the mens rea requirement for determinations of “true threats”). In Elonis
v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015), the Supreme Court held that § 875(c)
must contain a mens rea requirement although the statute itself does not address
criminal intent; ambiguities persist, however, because the Supreme Court ultimately
declined to explicitly define the degree of mens rea needed for a conviction under
the statute. Best, supra note 77, at 1157.
79
Amy E. McCann, Comment, Are Courts Taking Internet Threats Seriously
Enough? An Analysis of True Threats Transmitted Over the Internet, as Interpreted
in United States v. Carmichael, 26 PACE L. REV. 523, 527–28 (2006).
80
Id. at 528.
81
Crane, supra note 78, at 1236.
82
Id.
76
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the jurisdiction and the particular court’s interpretation of the statute’s
requirements. From November 1994 until approximately February
1995, the defendant in the case expressed his desire to harm women in
a series of extremely sadistic e-mails with another person whom he
met online.83 The following e-mails from Alkhabaz are representative
of the general nature of their communications:
I highly agree with the type of woman you like to
hurt…. I want to do it to a really young girl first. !3[sic]
or 14…. There [sic] innocence makes them so much
more fun--and they’ll be easier to control.84
I can’t wait to see you in person. I’ve been trying to
think of secluded spots. but [sic] my area knowledge of
Ann Arbor is mostly limited to the campus. I don’t
want any blood in my room, though I have come up
with an excellent method to abduct a bitch __ As I said
before, my room is right across from the girl’s
bathroom. Wiat[sic] until late at night. grab [sic] her
when she goes to unlock the door. Knock her
unconscious. and [sic] put her into one of those portable
lockers (forget the word for it). or [sic] even a duffle
bag. Then hurry her out to the car and take her
away…85
Just thinking about it anymore doesn’t do the trick … I
need TO DO IT.86
Alrighty [sic] then. If not next week. or [sic] in January.
then [sic] definitely sometime in the Summer [sic].87

83

United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1493 (6th Cir. 1997). Going by the
name Arthur Gonda, the true identity and whereabouts of the person with whom
Alkhabaz communicated remain unknown. Id.
84
Id. at 1499 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
85
Id. at 1500 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
86
Id. at 1501 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
87
Id. Alkhabaz’s e-mail was in response to a message from Gonda exclaiming, “My
feelings exactly! We have to get together…I will give you more details as soon as I
find out my situation….” Id.
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Prior to these communications, Alkhabaz had also posted a number of
fictitious stories online that “generally involved the abduction, rape,
torture, mutilation, and murder of women and young girls.”88 In one of
these stories, the victim shared the same name as one of Alkhabaz’s
classmates at the University of Michigan.89
Proclaiming to use an objective mens rea standard, the Sixth
Circuit ruled that the communications did not constitute a threat
because a reasonable person would not have taken the statements as “a
serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm.”90 The court
further read into § 875(c) a requirement that the government show
actus reus by proving that Alkhabaz sent the e-mails for the express
purpose of “effect[ing] some change or achiev[ing] some goal through
intimidation.”91 Short of actually being assaulted or worse, victims
will be hard pressed to meet their evidentiary burden in the Sixth
Circuit if Alkhabaz’s discussion of specific plans, a time frame, and
even his own pronouncement that “just thinking about it anymore
doesn’t do the trick”92 was not enough to show an intention to “effect
some change or achieve some goal.”93 The Sixth Circuit’s
interpretation of § 875(c) imposed an unworkable burden on victims.
B. 18 U.S.C § 2261A(2) is Insufficiently Broad to Account for the
Various Channels Through Which Cyberstalkers Reach Their
Victims
In 2006, Congress amended the Federal Interstate Stalking
Punishment and Prevention Act,94 originally passed as part of the
88

Id. at 1493 (stating that the stories were posted to the Usenet newsgroup
“alt.sex.stories”); see also What is Usenet?, USENET.ORG, http://www.usenet.org
(last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (describing newsgroups as the functional equivalent of
modern discussion forums).
89
Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1493.
90
Id. at 1496.
91
Id. at 1495.
92
Id. at 1501 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
93
Id. at 1496 (Krupansky, J., dissenting). Not until 2017 did the Sixth Circuit
demonstrate a greater willingness to consider context when interpreting § 875(c)’s
mens rea requirement. See United States v. Houston, No. 16-5007, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 5249, at *9, *11 (6th Cir. Mar. 23, 2017) (viewing the defendant’s statements
“in context,” the court found that “a reasonable jury” could infer from the
defendant’s tone of voice an intent to cause the victim serious injury).
94
18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2012).

Chung

132

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 17:1

Violence Against Women Act of 1994, to specifically address
cyberstalking.95 Prior to the 2006 amendments, § 2261 was limited to
actors who “with the intent to kill or injure” used the “mail or any
facility of interstate or foreign commerce to engage in a course of
conduct that places” another in reasonable fear of death or serious
bodily harm.96 In 2006, Congress broadened the scope of the statute to
read in relevant part:
“Whoever—
(2) with the intent (A) to kill, injure, harass, . . . uses
the mail, any interactive computer service, or any
facility of interstate or foreign commerce to engage in a
course of conduct that causes substantial emotional
distress to that person . . . shall be punished as provided
in Section 2261(b). (emphasis added)”97
Although Congress’ revision of the Federal Interstate Stalking and
Punishment and Prevention Act to account for cyberstalking is
commendable, the statute’s utility is still limited..
In United States v. Cassidy,98 the District Court for the District
of Maryland found § 2261A(2)(A) to be unconstitutional as applied to
a defendant who used Twitter and blog postings to harass the
prominent leader of a Buddhist sect in Poolesville, Maryland.99
Cassidy served as the Sect’s Chief Operating Officer for two weeks
before he left following a confrontation in which it was revealed that
he had misrepresented his qualifications.100 In the months following
his departure, Cassidy took to blog postings and Twitter to harass the

95

United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 581 (D. Md. 2011) (“Finally, the
2006 changes expanded the mechanisms of injury to add use of an “interactive
computer service” to the existing list which already included use of mail or any
facility of interstate or foreign commerce”).
96
Id. at 580.
97
Id. at 580–81.
98
Id. at 588.
99
Id. at 576–80.
100
Id. at 578. Contrary to the Sect’s teachings, Cassidy was allegedly an ardent
gossiper, lied about his lineage as a tulka, and falsely claimed to have had stage IV
lung cancer. Id.
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Sect.101 The Sect maintained that “all but a few hundred of the alleged
8,000 Tweets” pertained to the church.102
Ultimately, the court’s determination that § 2261A(2)(A) was
unconstitutional as applied to Cassidy turned on First Amendment free
speech protections.103 According to the court, while “the government
has a strong and legitimate interest in preventing the harassment of
individuals,” it was questionable whether the same interest extended to
comments and communications initiated online.104 Asserting that emails and phone calls were “targeted towards a particular victim
and…received outside a public forum,” the court found no compelling
government interest in protecting individuals from the content of
Tweets or blogs.105 Crucial to its holding, the court stated that users
have “the ability to ‘turn off’ (“block” or “unfollow”)
communications” and that the victim of Cassidy’s defamations “had
the ability to protect her ‘own sensibilities simply by averting’ her
eyes from the Defendant’s Blog.”106 The court also found the fact that
the victim was “easily identifiable [as a] public figure” to be
significant in that “the fundamental importance of the free flow of
ideas and opinions on matters of public concern is the core of the First
Amendment Protections.”107
The court’s rationale is inimical with the realities of what
cyberstalking victims face. The conclusion that a victim can avoid
harm simply by “averting her eyes” is an invidious misconception that
diminishes the gravity of cyberstalking as a serious crime with
serious—sometimes, tragic— real world consequences.108 In
101

Id. at 578–80.
Id. The Tweets—sent by at least ten different Twitter handles all registered to
Cassidy—included threats such as “want it to all be over soon sweetie?” and “Got a
wonderful Pearl Harbor Day surprise for [plaintiff]…. wait for it.” Id. at 588.
103
Shimizu, supra note 26, at 126–27.
104
Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 585 (quoting Thorne v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241, 243
(4th Cir. 1988)).
105
Id. at 585–86.
106
Id. at 578, 585 (quoting United States v. Playboy Ent. Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813
(2000)).
107
Id. at 586 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964)).
108
See Black, supra note 59 and accompanying text; see also Chris Wright, What
Happened Last Fall on This Tiny New Hampshire Street Triggered a National
Debate on Internet Crime. But Was the Web Really to Blame for the Death of Amy
Boyer?, BOS. PHOENIX (Aug. 10, 2000),
102
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California’s first conviction under its cyberstalking law, the victim did
not even own a computer; yet, the fact that she never saw the
defendant’s messages made neither the terror she felt nor the men who
accosted her at her home any less real.109 The Maryland court’s
proffered “avert your eyes” solution is just as inappropriate and
ineffective in the cyber context as it would be in any case involving a
victim of conventional stalking.110 Moreover, the Maryland court’s
distinction between harassment directed towards specific individuals
and harassment directed towards “public figures” is anachronistic in
the modern age of social media.111 The court cited the fact that the
victim had 17,221 followers on Twitter and over 143,000 views on her
videos as support for finding her to be a “public figure.” 112 Does a
person’s affinity for updating their social media channels transform
them into a public figure? What of the individual whose video
abruptly “goes viral” and amasses millions of views? In a day and age
where anyone can be “YouTube famous”113 or “Instagram famous,”114

http://www.bostonphoenix.com/archive/features/00/08/10/MURDER.html (reporting
on the death of Amy Boyer, a twenty-year-old college student, who was murdered
after being unknowingly cyberstalked for two and a half years. Her murderer, who
was able to purchase her Social Security number and address for a little more than
$150 online, chronicled his activities on a public website over the two and a half
years he stalked her—“It’s [actually] [obscene] what you can find out about a person
on the internet,” he once wrote. Id.).
109
GREGORIE, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 3; Joanna L. Mishler,
Comment, Cyberstalking: Can Communication Via the Internet Constitute a
Credible Threat and Should an Internet Service Provider Be Liable If It Does?, 17
SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 115, 116 (2001) (claiming the victim wrote the
following message, “Tell me you have a package, and when I open my door, attack
me. Tie me, gag me, rip off my clothes and go for it. I’ll struggle a little just for the
fun of it….”).
110
See Myths and Facts About Stalking, U. WIS. OSHKOSH,
http://www.uwosh.edu/couns_center/campus-victim-advocate/stalking/myths-andfacts-about-stalking (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (dispelling the myth that stalkers can
or should be ignored by explaining that “[t]he fact [that] there has been no danger up
until now does not mean it won’t come…even if the stalker has not made [] an
overtly dangerous statement, any words or behaviors that indicate an unwillingness
to let go…is a red flag.”).
111
Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 586.
112
Id. at 586 n.14.
113
See generally Gaby Dunn, Get Rich or Die Vlogging: The Sad Economics of
Internet Fame, FUSION (Dec. 14, 2015, 7:00 AM),
http://fusion.net/story/244545/famous-and-broke-on-youtube-instagram-socialmedia (contemplating how platforms such as YouTube and Instagram have led to the
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the court’s rationale in Cassidy potentially precludes from §
2261A(2)(A)’s protection a segment of the population that is arguably
at a heightened risk of cyberstalking and harassment.
IV. EXISTENT STATE STATUTES CANNOT BE RELIED UPON TO
ADDRESS THE HARMS INFLICTED BY CYBERSTALKING
In Maryland, there are three primary statutes under which the
state may bring criminal charges against a person engaged in
cyberstalking.115 All three laws are inadequate and ill-suited to address
the crime of stalking when it occurs through electronic mediums.
A. Maryland’s Traditional Stalking and Harassment Statutes
are Ill-Fitting as Applied to Cybercrimes
Maryland’s dedicated stalking statute, Crim. Law § 3-802,
defines stalking as “a malicious course of conduct that includes
approaching or pursuing another.”116 The major issue with prosecuting
a cyberstalking incident under § 3-802 is that the phrasing of the
statute could be read to require a degree of physical pursuit. 117 Under
this construction, cyberstalking would fall outside of the statute’s
purview. In Hackley v. State,118 Maryland’s intermediate appellate
court held that physical pursuit is a necessary element of the offense.
Granting certiorari, the Court of Appeals later reversed the lower
court’s ruling and held that the statute includes physical pursuit, but
does not explicitly require stalkers to approach their victims.119
Although the Court of Appeals’ holding is encouraging, it remains
largely inconclusive whether the entire range of activities that

popularization of web personalities and an increase in the number of individuals
pursuing internet fame).
114
Id.
115
See supra Part IV.A.
116
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-802(a) (LexisNexis 2012).
117
Hackley v. State, 866 A.2d 906, 912 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (the defendant
maintained that § 3-802 required a stalker to act “in the victim’s presence and with
the victim’s awareness.”).
118
Hackley v. State, 885 A.2d 816, 817 (Md. 2005).
119
Id. (“[W]e believe that the Court of Special Appeals misconstrued the statute and
shall hold that the crime of stalking does not require that the defendant approach or
pursue his victim”).
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constitute cyberstalking would fall within the scope of § 3-802.120 The
defendant’s conduct in this case conformed closely to the conventions
of traditional stalking and the court heavily relied on the defendant’s
real world, physical actions against the victim to determine his
culpability.121 In affirming the defendant’s conviction, the Court of
Appeals specifically cited the fact that he physically assaulted the
victim, repeatedly visited her house and left letters under the
windshield wiper of her car, and approached her multiple times in the
early morning.122 Hackley opens the door for a possible conviction of
cyberstalking under the stalking statute, but—because of the facts of
the case—is a poor metric of § 3-802’s viability in the cyberstalking
context.
Crim. Law § 3-803, Maryland’s harassment statute, is another
law under which prosecutors could potentially bring criminal charges
for cyberstalking. The statute, last amended in 2011, is inadequate in
much the same way the stalking statute is when applied to
cyberstalking.123 Both statutes are not specifically geared towards
cyberstalking and do not account for the complexities of stalking
behaviors carried out online. Specifically, § 3-803 is problematic
because it requires the perpetrator to receive a “reasonable warning or
request to stop by or on behalf of the other.”124 This requirement poses
an undue burden on victims who are either unaware of their stalker’s
online activities or who are otherwise unable to identify and contact
their stalker because of the anonymity that the Internet confers.125
Moreover, the statue is ambiguous as to what exactly “receipt” of a
reasonable warning entails. That is, it is unclear whether a victim must
prove that their stalker actually viewed the request, or whether
evidence that a request was sent would suffice.
120

See Brian Frosh & Kathleen Dumais, Bill Targets “Rape by Proxy”, BALT. SUN
(Feb. 3, 2014), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-02-03/news/bs-ed-internetsexual-assaults-20140203_1_victim-prince-george-jilted-lover (citing a Prince
George’s County case where more than 50 men accosted a woman and her children
at home after her ex-husband posted ad requests such as “Rape Me and My
Daughters,” Maryland Attorney General Brian Frosh explained that “prosecutors
were forced to cobble together a lengthy list of charges to accumulate a sentence that
would fit this novel crime.”).
121
Hackley, 885 A.2d at 822.
122
Id.
123
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-803 (LexisNexis 2011).
124
Id. § 3-803(2).
125
See supra Part II.B.
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B. Maryland’s Misuse of Electronic Mail Act Suffers from the
Same Limitations that Render the State’s Harassment Statute
Ineffective
Maryland’s Misuse of Electronic Mail Act, § 3-805, is perhaps
the state’s primary vehicle for prosecution of a cyberstalker.126 Unlike
the stalking and harassment statutes, § 3-805 explicitly prohibits the
use of “electronic communication” to “maliciously engage in a course
of conduct…[that] harass[es], alarm[s], or annoy[s] the other.”127
Although the state’s enactment of this measure is laudable, its utility to
victims of cyberstalking is critically undermined by the inclusion of §
3-803’s qualification that the offender must receive “a reasonable
warning or request to stop by or on behalf of the other.”128 Indeed, the
term “electronic communication” is limited only to “the transmission
of information, data, or a communication…that is sent to a person and
that is received by the person” (emphasis added).129 Because of this,
the statute discounts a variety of behaviors such as when stalkers enlist
third parties to help effectuate their goals130 or when blogs and web
sites such as Facebook and Twitter are used to make defamatory posts
that are either unknown to a victim or not specifically directed at a
victim.131
Furthermore, § 3-805 is puzzling in that “conduct that inflicts
serious emotional distress” falls within its scope of prohibited
behaviors only when the conduct is directed towards a minor. 132 The
increased scope of prohibited computer activities under § 3805(b)(1)(2) is apt in that minors are a vulnerable subset of the
population to whom the State should afford special consideration.133
126

MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-805 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2016).
Id. § 3-805(b)(1)(i).
128
Id. § 3-805(b)(1)(ii).
129
Id. § 3-805(a)(1)(2).
130
See Black, supra note 59.
131
See Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 579 n.6 (categorizing a number of the defendant’s
Tweets as not necessarily directed towards the plaintiff).
132
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-805(b)(1)(2).
133
See generally Charisse L. Nixon, Current Perspectives: The Impact of
Cyberbullying on Adolescent Health, 5 ADOLESCENT HEALTH, MED., THERAPEUTICS
143, 144 (2014) (correlating cyberbullying with the onset of depressive
symptomology such as feelings of “sadness, hopelessness, and powerlessness”
127
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However, emotional distress is no less serious or injurious when
inflicted on adult victims of cyberstalking.134 Emotional distress,
impaired psychological well-being, and decline in cognitive health are
some of the most well-documented harms that result from stalking.135
The state’s prohibition of “conduct that inflicts serious emotional
distress”—but only as applied to minors—shows a fundamental lack
of understanding as to one of the basic components of stalking.136
V. JUSTICE FOR MARYLAND CYBERSTALKING VICTIMS STARTS
WITH ADOPTION OF A STATUTE THAT FITS THE CRIME
As of November 2016, only six states have adopted separate
laws that expressly target cyberstalking.137 Of these states, three—
Illinois, Rhode Island, and Washington—have laws that address
solicitation of third party participants, and are thus likely to be
expansive enough to encompass the range of activities that constitute
cyberstalking.138
among adolescents); see also Maia Szalavitz, The Tragic Case of Amanda Todd,
TIME (Oct. 16, 2012), http://healthland.time.com/2012/10/16/the-tragic-case-ofamanda-todd (chronicling the events that led to fifteen year-old Amanda Todd’s
suicide after an online predator cyberstalked and blackmailed her with sexually
explicit photographs that he manipulated her into providing when Todd was just
twelve years old).
134
See Goodno, supra note 4, at 128 (discussing how stalking may cause “posttraumatic stress disorder, depression and serious emotional distress” in victims).
135
Lynne Roberts, Jurisdictional and Definitional Concerns with ComputerMediated Interpersonal Crimes: An Analysis on Cyber Stalking, 2 INT’L J. CYBER
CRIMINOLOGY 271, 273 (2008) (noting that “[t]he ongoing experience of
vulnerability may create more psychological distress than an actual physical
assault”).
136
See Avlana K. Eisenberg, Criminal Infliction of Emotional Distress, 113 MICH. L.
REV. 607, 609 (2015) (distinguishing stalking, bullying, and harassment as
fundamentally “criminal infliction of emotional distress” crimes; that is, crimes for
which the law “imposes liability for causing another person emotional harm.”).
137
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12–7.5 (2013); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.3 (2010); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-45-15 (West 2003 & SUPP. 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-196.3
(West 2015); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2 (West 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9.61.260 (2004).
138
See 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-4.2 (“Whoever transmits any communication by
computer or other electronic device to any person or causes any person to be
contacted for the sole purpose of harassing that person or his or her family is guilty”
…(emphasis added)); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260 (“A person is
guilty of cyberstalking if he or she, with intent to harass, intimidate, torment, or
embarrass any other person, and under circumstances not constituting telephone
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In formulating its own cyberstalking law, Maryland should
look to these states for guidance, but also be progressive in addressing
the ambiguities that make prosecuting and convicting offenders at the
federal139 and state level difficult.140 Ultimately, the success of a
prospective cyberstalking statute will hinge on the State’s ability to
articulate clear standards of actus reus and mens rea that (1) are
expansive enough to cover the range of activities that occur in
cyberspace,141 and (2) do not unfairly prejudice victims.142
A. An Actus Reus Standard that is Broad Enough to Account
for the Variety of Behaviors that Could Constitute
Cyberstalking
Engaging in a “malicious course of conduct” that puts another
in “reasonable fear of serious bodily injury” is the critical actus reus
requirement of Maryland’s current stalking statute.143 As for the actus
reus requirement of a prospective cyberstalking statute, engagement in
a “course of conduct” should also be the essential physical act needed
to establish criminal liability.144 As Naomi Goodno points out in
Cyberstalking, A New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current
State and Federal Laws, “punishing merely one instance of harassing
conduct may unjustly penalize one who acts once out of anger, versus
one who engages in a series of terrifying acts.”145 Generally, it is
difficult to quantify exactly when certain actions lose their
independence and become recognized as part of a “course” of
behavior.146 With respect to cyberstalking, however, “course of
harassment, makes an electronic communication to such other person or a third
party” (emphasis added)).
139
See supra Part III.
140
See supra Part IV.
141
See infra Part V.A.
142
See infra Part V.B.
143
Hackley, 885 A.2d at 820.
144
See Shimizu, supra note 26, at 117. By its definition, stalking requires a course of
conduct; singular incidents or occurrences do not qualify. Id.
145
Goodno, supra note 4, at 134.
146
RICHARD CARD, CARD, CROSS, AND JONES: CRIMINAL LAW 217 (21st ed. 2014)
(“It is not simply a matter of counting the number of incidents. There must be a
sufficient connection between the acts in type and context as to justify the conclusion
that they amount to a course of conduct.”). Nor can course of conduct be
presupposed by looking at timeframes—sending an email or message every year on
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conduct” must be taken to mean two or more occasions. 147 A more
stringent definition that uses any number other than two as the
baseline for establishing a pattern would only challenge offenders to
inflict the greatest degree of harm in the least number of incidents
possible.148
The actus reus component of a cyberstalking statute must also
be expansive enough reflect the complexities of stalking crimes. A key
shortcoming of Maryland’s traditional stalking law is that “a malicious
course of conduct” is defined only as behaviors that place another in
reasonable fear of “serious bodily injury,” “an assault in any degree,”
“rape or sexual offense,” “false imprisonment,” or “death.”149
Stalking, especially in the context of domestic violence, is about more
than just explicit threats of violence; it is a crime of power and
control.150 The means through which offenders undermine the
autonomy of their victims, and the type of harms inflicted are many
and varied.151 Consequently, Maryland’s cyberstalking statute must
broadly cover online conduct that inflicts not only physical injury, but
also psychological and emotional distress—conduct that threatens not
just the safety of victims, but also the safety of loved ones.152

a particular date and calling three separate times in rapid succession are examples of
behaviors that take place on drastically different time lines, but may nevertheless
both amount to a course of conduct. Id.
147
The federal stalking statute and some states use two as the minimum number of
incidents required to establish a course of conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2266 (2012) (“The
term ‘course of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct composed of 2 or more acts,
evidencing a continuity of purpose.”); see also D.C. CODE § 22-3132 (2009) (“‘To
engage in a course of conduct’ means directly or indirectly, or through one or more
third persons, in person or by any means, on 2 or more occasions”.).
148
See discussion infra Part V.B. Just as setting two as the baseline in traditional
stalking statutes does not cast an overly broad net, it is a similarly appropriate
minimum as applied to cyberstalking statutes. Those who innocuously or accidently
perform an act that constitutes cyberstalking more than once will remain shielded
due to absence of mens rea.
149
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3–802(a)(1).
150
See Major, supra note 44 and accompanying text.
151
Roberts, supra note 135, at 273.
152
See KATRINA BAUM ET AL., STALKING VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2,
OFFICE OF JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (2009) (“The fears and emotional
distress that stalking engenders are many and varied…. About 4 in 10 stalkers
threatened the victim or the victim’s family, friends, co-workers, or family pet.”).
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Finally, regarding Maryland’s harassment statute, the
requirement that a person must receive “a reasonable warning or
request to stop,” before the conduct becomes criminal is impractical as
applied to cyber-based crimes.153 As discussed, in many cases, victims
are not aware of their stalker’s online activities, or if they are aware,
they may not be able to identify their stalkers sufficiently to issue a
warning.154
B. A Standard of Mens Rea that Allows for Proper
Identification of “Credible Threats” in Cyberspace
The mens rea element of cyberstalking should be an objective
standard that looks to whether a reasonable person “would take the
statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily
harm.”155 The alternative, a subjective standard that instead looks to
whether a reasonable person “would foresee that the listener would
interpret the speech as a threat of violence” places too arduous a
burden on the government and victim.156 Under the subjective
standard, a defendant who places a victim in reasonable fear of serious
bodily injury or death will go unpunished if the government cannot
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant understood the
communication to be threatening.157 Under ordinary circumstances,
this burden of proof is exceedingly difficult to satisfy.158 In the context
of electronic communications, it would be nearly impossible because
cues such as tone of voice, facial expression, and demeanor are
unavailable in cyberspace. Consequently, defendants could always
allege that a comment was made in jest or simply misinterpreted by
the victim.159
153

MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-803(a)(2).
See supra notes 53–54, 63–68 and accompanying text.
155
Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1494 (internal citation omitted).
156
McCann, supra note 79, at 528.
157
Vikram D. Amar & Alan E. Brownstein, The Supreme Court to Consider When
Threats Can Be Punished Consistent with the First Amendment, JUSTIA (Oct. 10,
2014), https://verdict.justia.com/2014/10/10/supreme-court-consider-threats-canpunished-consistent-first-amendment.
158
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (defining “beyond reasonable
doubt” as “a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused”).
159
See NANCY WILLARD, EDUCATOR’S GUIDE TO CYBERBULLYING AND
CYBERTHREATS 3, CTR. SAFE & RESPONSIBLE USE OF THE INTERNET (2007),
https://education.ohio.gov/getattachment/Topics/Other-Resources/SchoolSafety/Safe-and-Supportive-Learning/Anti-Harassment-Intimidation-and-Bullying154
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An objective determination of whether or not an individual
intended to inflict harm is the appropriate standard because “like an
offline stalker, a cyberstalker should have to ‘intentionally’ engage in
conduct that causes his target to fear for her safety” in order to be held
criminally liable.160 However, it is also important to consider that, in
many cases of cyberstalking, the victim knows the offender and is
likely to have had some sort of relationship with him.161 In the context
of cyberstalking as part of domestic violence, the objective standard
should be flexible enough to acknowledge that not all threats are
blatantly obvious.162 Comments and actions of the offender must be
situated in the context of the relationship between the offender and
victim.163 An assessment of this nature that looks to the totality of the
circumstances is consistent with an objective standard of mens rea.164
Similar to how courts assess an officer’s determination of probable
cause,165 a court should consider whether a reasonable person in the

Resource/Educator-s-Guide-Cyber-Safety.pdf.aspx (discussing the difficulty and
ambiguity of interpreting communications in cyberspace).
160
Goodno, supra note 4, at 134. Inclusion of this intent requirement is crucial—in
2016, the Illinois Appellate Court held that both Illinois’ general stalking and
cyberstalking statutes were “facially unconstitutional under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment,” for lack of a mens rea standard, i.e., that a person must
actually intend to inflict emotional distress. People v. Relerford, 56 N.E.3d 489,
495–97 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). As of April 7, 2017, the case is still pending after the
Illinois Supreme Court granted the State’s appeal as a matter of right. DAVID
BERGSCHNEIDER, SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT CRIMINAL ISSUES PENDING IN THE
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT 3, OFFICE OF THE STATE APPELLATE DEFENDER (2017),
https://www.illinois.gov/osad/Publications/Documents/pend.pdf.
161
See Fisher & Sloan, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (“When
specifically examining perpetrators who are known to the victim, the most common
victim/offender relationships were friends/former friends (25.4%), boyfriends/exboyfriends (12.1%) . . .”).
162
See Major, supra note 44 and accompanying text.
163
See supra notes 19–31 and accompanying text.
164
Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1494 (internal citation omitted).
165
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (noting that an officer’s
determination of probable cause “must be seen and weighed not in terms of library
analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law
enforcement.”); see also Susan F. Mandiberg, Reasonable Officers vs. Reasonable
Lay Persons in the Supreme Court’s Miranda and Fourth Amendment Cases, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1481, 1496 (2010) (“Although the issuing magistrate is the
one who must draw conclusions, the perspective of the reasonable officer is central
to the inquiry.”).
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victim’s place “would take the statement as a serious expression of an
intention to inflict bodily harm.”166
C. A Proposed Amendment to Maryland’s Criminal Code
This Comment proposes an amendment of Maryland’s criminal
statutes to incorporate the following cyberstalking legislation.
Borrowing judiciously and generously from the language of Illinois
and Washington’s cyberstalking statutes,167 the proposal is broad
enough to sufficiently address the multifaceted nature of
cyberstalking. The prescribed mens rea and actus reus requirements
are formulated to minimize any chilling effect on First Amendment
protections:
A person shall be found guilty of the crime of cyberstalking
if:
(a) He or she—with the intent to harass, intimidate,
coerce, threaten, embarrass, or torment—uses a
form of electronic communication on at least two
separate occasions in a manner that would cause a
reasonable person to:
(1) Fear for his or her own safety, or the safety of
another person, or
(2) Suffer serious psychological or emotional
distress.
When committed as part of a course of conduct, proscribed
activities include, but are not limited to:
(a) The use of any lewd, lascivious, indecent, or
obscene words, images, or language, or suggesting
the commission of any lewd or lascivious act;168
(b) Threats of assault, sexual or otherwise, directed at a
person’s self, their property, or any member of their
family or household

166

Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1494 (citation omitted).
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.5, invalidated by People v. Relerford, 56 N.E.3d 489
(Ill. App. Ct. 2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260.
168
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260(1)(a).
167
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(c) Solicitation of third parties to commit an act in
violation of any provision of this code
For the purposes of this Section:
“Course of conduct” shall be taken to mean a pattern of
conduct composed of two or more acts that is without
legitimate reason and evidences a unity of purpose.
“Electronic communication” shall be taken to mean the
transmission of information by wire, radio, optical
cable, electromagnetic technology, or any other similar
means. This includes, but is not limited to, e-mail,
social media platforms, websites, pager service, text
messaging, voice mail, and other internet-based
channels of communication.169
“Reasonable person” shall be taken to mean a person in
the victim’s circumstances, with the victim’s
knowledge of the defendant, with the victim’s
knowledge of the defendant’s prior acts, and within the
context of the victim’s relationship with the defendant.
“Third parties” shall be taken to mean any person other
than the person violating these provisions and the
victim or persons towards whom the violator’s actions
are directed.170 A person who solicits a third party to
violate the provisions of this Section will be found
guilty of cyberstalking just as surely as if the person
committed the act him or herself.
CONCLUSION
California passed the first stalking statute in 1990.171 By 1993,
almost all 50 states and the District of Columbia had amended their
169

Adapted from WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.61.260(5).
Adapted from 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12–7.5(C)(7), invalidated by People v.
Relerford, 56 N.E. 3d (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
171
Christine B. Gregson, Comment, California’s Antistalking Statute: The Pivotal
Role of Intent, 28 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 221 n.2 (1998) (enacting the nation’s
first anti-stalking statute, California was the first state to criminalize the repeated
170
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penal codes with some form of anti-stalking legislation.172 This
process through which society recognizes and responds to deviant
behaviors through legislative reform is fundamental to the preservation
of law and order. The reality that we must confront is that
technological innovation has drastically expanded the scope of
stalking victimizations.173 Without parallel development in laws,
stalkers who utilize electronic mediums to achieve their ends will
continue to fall through gaps in federal and state statutory schemes.174
Instead of amending traditional stalking laws in ways that ultimately
prove to only be half measures,175 separate and distinct cyberstalking
statutes are needed that can be properly scoped to reflect the realities
of modern society.

following or harassment of another person “with the intent to place that person in
reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family”).
172
Shonah Jefferson & Richard Shafritz, A Survey of Cyberstalking Legislation, 32
U. WEST. L.A. L. REV. 323, 326–27 (2001).
173
See supra Part II.B.
174
See supra Part III–IV.
175
See discussion supra Part III.B.

